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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
The decision appears to be well within the Dobkin rationale. In
both situations service is made upon a "token defendant" and an in-
surer who is the real party in interest in order to afford a presumably
worthy plaintiff a forum. Furthermore, the cases are in harmony with
the philosophy adopted by the Court of Appeals in Seider v. Roth.49
CPLR 311(1): "Acting" managing agent not managing agent for pur-
pose of receiving service on behalf of corporation.
CPLR 311(l) substantially adopts and combines the provisions of
CPA 228(8) and (9) and CPA 229, 50 thus apparently ending the trouble-
some distinction between service on domestic and foreign corpora-
tions.' 1 However, practitioners are still faced with a problem that
existed under the CPA--when is defendant's employee a "managing
agent" for purposes of determining whether or not delivery of the
summons upon him will constitute personal service upon the corpora-
tion?52
While the statute is dear on its face,53 it is often difficult, if not
impossible, for a process server to determine if the recipient of the
summons is indeed what he purports to be- a managing agent in
fact.54 Moreover, managing agents are not always readily available to
the summons by the police to the defendant for operating an automobile with-
out an operator's license, at the time of the accident. 6. A letter from the Dept. of
Motor Vehicles of the State of New York stating whether their records indicate
whether or not defendant has an operator's license and what address it has for
defendant.
59 Misc. 2d at 203-04, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 203-04. Counsel involved in litigation over sub-
stituted service and a real party in interest should endeavor to accumulate this informa-
tion and material in advance of any application to a court under CPLR 308(4).
49 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See generally Note, Seider
v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58 (1968).
60 1 WnNsrN, KoaN & MLLraR, NEv YoRK Cvii PRACarcE 311.01 (1968).
51 Compare Kiely v. Utica Gas 8- Elec. Co., 134 Misc. 258, 235 N.Y.S. 288 (County
Ct. Herkimer County 1929) with SEcoD REP,. at 161 n. 8.
62 At this juncture it should be noted that one authority has suggested that, pratti-
cally speaking, a lesser quantum of proof may be required to establish that someone is a
managing agent for a foreign corporation, in contrast to a domestic corporation, due to
the fact that there are less personnel to receive process on its behalf. 1 WmNsrmN, KoRN
& MILLER, Nmv YoRu CrvxL PRAcricE 311.05 (1968).
53 CPLR 311 provides, in part, that:
Personal service upon a corporation ... shall be made by delivering the
summons as follows:
1. upon any domestic or foreign corporation, to an officer, director, manag-
ing or general agent, or cashier or assistant cashier....
54 In Taylor v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 136 N.Y. 343, 346, 32 N.E. 992, 993
(1893), the Court of Appeals defined a managing agent as
some person invested by the corporation with general powers involving the ex-
ercise of judgment and discretion, as distinguished from an ordinary agent or
attorney, who acts in an inferior capacity and under the discretion and control
of superior authority, both in regard to the extent of his duty and the manner of
executing it.
But see Palmer v. Pennsylvania Co., 35 Hun. 369 (2d Dep't), affd, 99 N.Y. 679 (1885).
"Every object of the service is attained when the agent is of sufficient character and rank
1969]
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accept service of process, and alternative, authorized personnel may be
difficult to locate. It is for these reasons that several exceptions to strict
compliance with the statute have arisen.
A case arising under the CPA55 illustrates one such exception. In
Collini v. Turner Construction Co.,55 service was upheld upon defen-
dant's head bookkeeper who was temporarily acting as a managing
agent. The defendant was a domestic corporation employing forty to
fifty people at the premises where service was effected. However, the
bookkeeper's superior, who was authorized to accept service of pro-
cess, was on vacation, and the only other available person so authorized
was the corporation president who was not informed of the process
server's presence. The bookkeeper had previously accepted service of
approximately six garnishee orders in the corporation's behalf, and,
although she was not certain, she also thought she had previously
accepted other legal documents for the corporation. On the occasion
in question, she promised to "take care" of the summons and com-
plaint. The court reasoned that CPA 228 could, in the proper circum-
stances, be liberally construed so as to apply to one acting as a managing
agent at the time of service. Moreover, the court expressed the follow-
ing view:
It is inconceivable that where, as here, the president is undisturbed
in his private office and the comptroller [the bookkeeper's superior]
is away on vacation that no person remains qualified to act as
managing agent in so large an establishment.57
The Collini exception was adopted and clarified without reference
by the supreme court in Buckner v. D. & E. Motors, Inc.5s In Buckner,
plaintiff's attorney served defendant's office manager on the business
premises after he was told that the owner was absent. The defendant
later contended that the office manager was not the proper person to
serve pursuant to CPLR 311(1), but the court, declaring that the sec-
tion called for a liberal construction, held that the statute may be
properly interpreted to apply to one who is acting as a managing agent
at the time of service. In this court's view, it was decisive that the office
manager had held himself out as a person of responsibility. He had
to make it reasonably certain that the defendant will be apprised of the service made."
35 Hun. at 371. See also Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915
(1917).
55 It should be noted that "the [CPLR's] phraseology . . . 'managing or general
agent' is intended to simplify [the phraseology found in the CPA] without any change in
substance .. " SECOND REP. at 161 n. 8. (emphasis added).
56 129 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1954).
57 Id. at 486.
58 53 Misc. 2d 382, 278 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1967).
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neither objected to accepting the summons nor had he informed
plaintiff's attorney that he was unauthorized to receive the same. 9
Green v. Morningside Heights Housing Corp.,60 illustrates a
second exception formulated by the courts in order to ensure that the
provisions for service upon domestic or foreign corporations are not
drowned in a sea of technicalities. In Green, service upon a managing
agent's receptionist under the CPA was upheld on the ground that
"[w]here the delivery is so close both in time and space that it can
be classified as part of the same act, service is effected."61 This con-
clusion was reached in spite of the fact that an executive vice-president
was apparently available on the premises to receive service of process.
The courts, however, have not always been so liberal in their
construction of the foregoing provisions. Indeed, they have often held
due diligence to be a condition precedent to the effectuation of valid
personal service where such service has been made upon the wrong
person. This is true even if the summons is subsequently received by
the correct party within a short time thereafter.62 In McDonald v. Ames
Supply Co.,03 the Court of Appeals stated that the reason for this rule
lies in the fact that to hold otherwise "would negate the statutory pro-
cedure for setting aside a defectively served summons, since the motion
itself is usually evidence that the summons has been received .... -64
The most recent pronouncement in the area was rendered by the
Appellate Division, Third Department, in Isaf v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road Co.65 Plaintiffs were unable to properly serve the co-defendant
and appellant, the Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Co., by serving the
Secretary of State pursuant to the New York Business Corporation
59 But see Coles v. Pittsburgh Bridge Co., 146 N.Y. 281, 40 N.E. 779 (1895); Loeb v.
Star & Herald Co., 187 App. Div. 175, 179, 175 N.Y.S. 412, 415 (1st Dep't 1919): "That
[the person served] assumed to act as agent for the defendant is not sufficient. He must
have been authorized by it so to act."
60 13 Misc. 2d 124, 177 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d
708, 180 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ist Dep't 1958).
61 13 Misc. 2d at 125, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
62 See, e.g., McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 238 N.E.2d 726, 291 N.Y.S.2d
328 (1968) (summons left with building receptionist without even ascertaining if she was
defendant's employee); Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 281
App. Div. 867, 119 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Ist Dep't 1953) (summons left with receptionist when
any one of defendant's thirteen available officers could have been served with due
diligence); O'Connell v. Gallagher, 104 App. Div. 492, 93 N.Y.S. 643 (Ist Dep't 1905) (sum-
mons left on floor of defendant's residence before defendant's employee whom the server
"thought" was defendant). Contra, Erale v. Edwards, 47 Misc. 2d 213, 262 N.Y.S.2d 44
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1965). See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST.
JoHN's L. Rav. 303, 313 (1966).
63 22 N.Y.2d 111, 238 N.E.2d 726, 291 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1968).
64Id. at 115, 238 N.E.2d at 728, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
65 32 App. Div. 2d 578, 299 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969).
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Law"6 because the appellant was a domestic railroad. 67 Accordingly,
plaintiffs' attorney endeavored to serve appellant at one of its railroad
stations. The freight agent was temporarily absent, but appellant's chief
clerk, after being informed of the reason for the attorney's visit, agreed
to accept service of the summons and complaint, whereupon he was
served. The freight agent returned within one-half hour after service,
received and read the papers, called his superior, and forwarded copies
of the papers to appropriate representatives of the appellant the very
same day. The chief clerk subsequently testified that he was in charge
of the office when the freight agent was absent, and that he had received
service of garnishee orders in appellant's behalf on several occasions.
On the basis of these facts, special term held that the freight agent
qualified as a "managing agent" under CPLR 311, and that the chief
clerk became an acting "managing agent" upon whom service could
also properly be made since he took charge of the office in the freight
agent's absence. The appellate division, reversing on the law and the
facts, granted appellant's motion to dismiss the complaint and to vacate
and set aside service of the summons and complaint.
The court was certain that the chief clerk's duties (clerk, book-
keeper and timekeeper) were not the acts of a managing agent within
the intendment of the CPLR. Moreover, his temporary assumption of
the freight agent's duties was qualitatively insufficient to authorize
service upon him as an agent of the defendant corporation and sub-
sequent redelivery of the papers to those authorized to receive them
did not validate the process. 8
The Isaf decision is thus based upon the premise that the chief
clerk could not, under the circumstances, become a managing agent
even for a temporary period. This holding appears to be both hyper-
technical and untenable.
Collini recognized the principle that one could temporarily as-
sume the role of managing agent for service of process in a large
establishment where no one else was available to accept service. Except
for the size of the establishment at which service was attempted,69 the
facts in Isaf are strikingly similar to the facts in Collini. In addition,
the Buckner decision clearly establishes that one can satisfy the re-
66 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 806 (McKinney 1963).
67 See id. § 103 (exclusion for corporations formed under the New York Railroad
Law).
68 32 App. Div. 2d at 579, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
69 Service in Isaf was attempted at appellant's station in Elmira, New York, a "business
establishment" concededly smaller with respect to the number of employees than the
defendant's premises in Collini.
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quirement for a managing agent by holding himself out as one re-
sponsible to accept service and inform the corporate defendant thereof.
The chief clerk in Isaf apparently did just that. Furthermore, the facts
in Isaf readily lend themselves to the "close in time and space" principle
enunciated in Green.
Moreover, the cases relied upon by the appellate division in Isaf
(McDonald v. Ames Supply Co.70 and Clark v. Fifty Seventh Madison
Corp.7 1) are clearly distinguishable. In McDonald, the person served
was the building receptionist, and the process server was not sure that
she was defendant's employee; in Clark, the recipient was not identified
in the opinion. In neither case, however, could the plaintiff contend
that he had acted with the same reasonableness and diligence exercised
by the plaintiff in Isaf. And in McDonald, the Court of Appeals stated
that in some instances
service is sustained even though the process server did not in fact
hand the summons to the proper party.... In [such] cases, the
process server has acted reasonably and diligently in attempting to
fulfill the statutory mandate and under circumstances bringing the
questioned process within the purview of the person to be served.
Consequently, upholding service in such cases does not endanger
the statutory scheme by encouraging careless service.72
It is submitted, therefore, that the Isaf court failed to reach the
proper conclusion, and it is hoped that future cases will construe GPLR
311(1) more liberally in an effort to "adhere less strictly to form and
give greater recognition to reality."7 3 Nevertheless, the case illustrates
the close questions involved in the selection of a managing agent for
service of process, and serves as a warning to the practitioner that he
must exercise the utmost care in the selection of a corporate representa-
tive upon whom such service may be made.74
7022 N.Y.2d 111, 238 N.E.2d 726, 291 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1968).
71 13 App. Div. 2d 693, 213 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 10 N.Y.2d 808,
178 N.E.2d 225, 221 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1961).
7222 N.Y.2d at 115-16, 238 N.E.2d at 728, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 331-32, citing: Marcy v.
Woodin, 18 App. Div. 2d 944, 237 N.Y.S.2d 402 (3d Dep't 1963) (personal service upon
defendant's son upheld); Green v. Morningside Heights Housing Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 124,
177 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 708, 180 N.Y.S.2d 104
(1st Dep't 1958). But see Ives v. Darling, 210 App. Div. 521, 206 N.Y.S. 493 (3d Dep't 1924)
(personal service upon defendant's husband at her request held invalid in absence of
justifying factors).
Cf. cases upholding personal service upon natural persons where the defendants re-
sisted service, and the process servers left the summonses in their general vicinity: Buscher
v. Ehrich, 12 App. Div. 2d 887, 209 N.Y.S.2d 941 (4th Dep't 1961); Chernick v. Rodrigues,
2 Misc. 2d 891, 150 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956); Levine v. National Transp.
Co., 204 Misc. 202, 125 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1953).
73 Marcy v. Woodin, 18 App. Div. 2d 944, 945, 237 N.Y.5.2d 402, 403 (3d Dep't 1963).
74 See 1 W EINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YoRK CivIL PRAcricE 311.06 (1968).
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